In the paradigm of network coding, the information-theoretic security problem is encountered in the presence of a wiretapper, who has capability of accessing an unknown channel-subset in communication networks. In order to combat this eavesdropping attack, secure network coding is introduced to prevent information from being leaked to adversaries. For any construction of secure linear network codes (SLNCs) over a wiretap network, the based field size is a very important index, because it largely determines the computational and space complexities, and further the efficiency of network transmission.
I. INTRODUCTION
The information-theoretic security was introduced by Shannon firstly in his seminal and celebrated paper [1] , where a model, the so-called Shannon cipher system, is proposed. In this model, a sender wishes to transmit a private message to a receiver under the existence of a wiretapper, and it is required that the wiretapper can obtain no information about the message. For this purpose the sender encrypted the message with a random key which is shared to the receiver via a "secure" channel, but is unknown to the wiretapper. The encrypted message is transmitted via "public" channel to the receiver, and meanwhile it is also eavesdropped by the wiretapper. Finally, the receiver can recover the message from both the random key and the encrypted message, while the wiretapper obtains nothing on the message. In [2] , Ozarow and Wyner studied a similar model called the wiretap channel II. In this model, the sender's message is transmitted to the receiver through a set of noiseless point-to-point channels. It is assumed that a wiretapper can fully access any one but not more than one subset of channels, referred to a wiretap set, out of a collection A of all possible wiretap sets, where A is specified by the problem under consideration. For example in [2] , the collection A contains all the subsets of the channel set with a fixed size. Similar to the Shannon cipher system, the strategy to protect the message from being leaked to the wiretapper is still to employ random key to randomize the message. Another well-known cipher system of information-theoretic security is the secret sharing, proposed independently by Blakley [3] and Shamir [4] , which subsumes the former two models as special cases.
In 2000, network coding is proposed by Ahlswede et al. in [5] , which allows internal nodes in a communication network to process the information received. This idea was first appeared in Yeung and Zhang [6] and then developed by Ahlswede et al. [5] . In [5] , the authors showed that if coding is applied at the nodes in a network, rather than routing alone, the source node can multicast messages to all sink nodes at the theoretically maximum rate-the smallest minimum cut capacity between the source and each sink node, as the alphabet size of information sources approaches infinity. Li et al. [7] further indicated that linear network coding with finite alphabet size is sufficient for multicast by using a vector space approach. Then Koetter and Médard [8] developed an algebraic characterization of linear network coding by using a matrix approach. The above two approaches correspond respectively to global and local descriptions of linear network coding. Subsequently, Jaggi et al. [9] proposed a deterministic polynomialtime algorithm for constructing a linear network code. In Tan et al. [10] , the fundamental concept of linear independence among global encoding kernels is studied in depth, and this linear independence naturally induces a matroid [11] . Based on this, a unified framework and a unified construction for different classes of linear network codes are obtained further in [10] . An interesting work on the field size of linear network codes over acyclic multicast networks is studied by Sun et al. [12] recently,. Their main contribution reveals that the existence of a solvable linear network code over a given finite field does not imply the existence of a solvable one over all larger finite field, and several specific cases are given to show this result. For a detailed and comprehensive discussions of network coding, refer to [13] - [17] .
In the paradigm of network coding, the information-theoretic security problem is also encountered in the presence of a wiretapper, who has capability of accessing an unknown channel-set in communication networks. This secure problem was introduced firstly by Cai and Yeung in [18] , and then in their journal paper [19] , they proposed the model of a communication system on a wiretap network (CSWN) and secure network coding to prevent information from being leaked. Specifically, the wiretapper are not allowed to obtain any information about the private message by accessing any wiretap set, while all sink nodes as legal users can decode the secured source messages with zero error. This CSWN model subsumes secret sharing. Subsequently, they also proposed a construction of secure linear network codes (SLNCs) to combat the wiretapper, and similar to the classical wiretap channel models [1] , [2] , it is necessary to randomize the source message in the wiretap network model to guarantee the informationtheoretic security. Particularly, for a special case of this model, that is, the wiretapper can access up to a fixed number of channels arbitrarily, the SLNCs constructed by their algorithm multicast the maximum possible amount of information to sink nodes securely and use the minimum amount of randomness to achieve the required information-theoretic security when the source message is distributed uniformly.
Rouayheb et al. [20] showed that this CSWN model can be regarded as a network generalization of the wiretap channel II in [2] and presented another construction of SLNCs by applying secure codes for the wiretap channel II. Motivated by Rouayheb et al.s' formulation, Silva and Kschischang [21] studied the universal secure network coding via rank-metric codes, that is, the design of linear network codes for message transmission and the design of security against the wiretapper can be completely separated from each other. For any construction of SLNCs, the required alphabet size or the size of the base finite field, is very important, because it largely determines the complexities of the construction including space and computational complexities, and further the efficiency of network transmission. This index is also very important for the process of secure network coding from theoretical research to practical applications.
However, the existing results show that these constructions require very large field size, which leads to inefficiency in general. In [22] , Feldman et al. derived tradeoffs between security, code alphabet, and information rate of SLNCs, which indicated that if we give up a part of overall capacity, we may use a field of smaller size. This tradeoff can be also obtained from [19] as mentioned in their paper.
Motivated by the importance of field size, reducing the field size for constructing SLNCs is very attractive and meaningful. Even just for the above special case, it was proposed as an open and interesting problem in [20] . So in this paper, we further explore this field size and obtain new lower bounds which considerably reduce the field size without giving up any part of capacity. For the special case that the wiretapper can access up to a fixed number of edges, Cai and Yeung [19] and Rouayheb et al. [20] presented two secure network coding schemes, respectively. Although both coding schemes are actually equivalent, the lower bound on the field size for Rouayheb et al.'s scheme is smaller than that of Cai and Yeung's. Furthermore, a much smaller lower bound for this case was obtained by Guang et al. [23] , where a useful equivalence relation is introduced in networks and the number of equivalence classes is their best lower bound. Moreover, an example was taken to compare these different results, that also shows the benefit of their result. However, for a plenty of and more general cases, i.e., the collection A of wiretap sets can consist of arbitrary edge-subsets of networks, the current results still keep a very large size, which are unsatisfactory and inefficiency. In the present paper, we will take more general cases into account and obtain new and better lower bounds for the constructions of SLNCs. In particular, the best lower bound in [23] for the special case is subsumed by our results, when restricting them to the special case. On the other hand, since our discussed model contains secret sharing, we also believe that our works do possibly help to solve the open problem that determining the minimum size of the fields over which some secret sharing schemes can be constructed [24] , [25] , or at least help to get better bounds.
This problem is unsolved even for threshold access structures, in which case it is equivalent to the main conjecture for maximum distance separable (MDS) codes [26] , [27] , or to determine over which fields uniform matroids are representable [28, Problem 6.5.12], etc. Furthermore, much less is known for the general case. Differently to the threshold case, there is a huge gap between the known lower and upper bounds.
In addition, another meaningful and important problem for explicit constructions of SLNCs is how to efficiently determine the obtained lower bounds since they depend on network topology. Motivated by a desire to develop methods with low complexity to solve this problem, we propose efficient approaches to determine the lower bounds and give a series of algorithms for efficient implementation, which apply many techniques and modify some algorithms in graph theory. We further analyze the complexity of our algorithms and show that all of them are polynomial-time. Furthermore, our presented algorithms are also attractive since its good performance of the complexity for the worst case. In particular, when using them to the special case that the wiretapper can access up to a fixed number of edges arbitrarily, our algorithms degenerate to the one for efficiently finding the number of equivalence classes, the best lower bound for the special case, and a representative of every equivalence class. This solves an open problem proposed in [23] , that is how to efficiently implement the main lower bound on the field size in the special case.
The rest of paper is organized as follows. In Section II, we review secure network coding and particularly give preliminaries including the fundamental notation and definitions. The two new and better lower bounds for constructing SLNCs on a wiretap network (G, A) are proved in Section III. Section IV is devoted to the approaches to determine the obtained lower bounds and a series of algorithms for efficient implementation. We further analyze the complexity of our algorithms in this section, which shows that they are polynomial-time. Finally, we conclude in Section V with a summary of our results.
II. PRELIMINARIES
In this section, we first present the model of wiretap networks to be discussed throughout this paper.
Let G = (V, E) be a finite acyclic directed network with a single source s and a set T ⊂ V of sink nodes, where V and E are the sets of nodes and edges, respectively. In G, a direct edge e = (i, j) ∈ E stands for a channel leading from node i to node j. Node i is called the tail of e and node j is called the head of e, denoted by tail(e) and head(e), respectively. Further, for a node i, define Out(i) as the set of outgoing channels of i and In(i) as the set of incoming channels of i. Formally, Out(i) = {e ∈ E : tail(e) = i} and In(i) = {e ∈ E : head(e) = i}. For each edge e ∈ E, there is a positive number R e , say the capacity of e. We allow multiple channels between two nodes and thus assume reasonably that the capacity of each edge is 1 per unit time, in other words, the network G is unit-capacity. Further let A be a collection of subsets of the edge set E and every subset in A is called a wiretap set. Then a wiretap network is referred to a quadruple (G, s, T, A), where the source node s generates source messages and injects them into the network; each sink node t ∈ T as a legal user is required to receive the source messages with zero error and generally there is more than one sink node in G, i.e., |T | > 1; and each wiretap set in A may be fully accessed by a wiretapper, but no wiretapper can access more than one wiretap set in A.
Usually, both the source node s and the set T of sink nodes are assumed to be known well, and so we use (G, A) to denote such a wiretap network for simplicity.
In a communication network, if a sequence of edges (e 1 , e 2 , · · · , e m ) satisfies tail(e 1 ) = i, head(e m ) = j, and tail(e k+1 ) = head(e k ) for all k = 1, 2, · · · , m − 1, we say that the sequence (e 1 , e 2 , · · · , e m ) is a path from the node i to the node j, or from the edge e 1 to the node j, or from the node i to the edge e m . A cut between the source node s and a non-source node t is a set of edges whose removal disconnects s from t. For unit-capacity edges, the capacity of a cut between s and t can be regarded as the number of edges in it, and the minimum of all capacities of cuts between s and t is called the minimum cut capacity between them, denoted by C t . A cut between s and t is called a minimum cut if its capacity achieves the minimum cut capacity between them. Similarly, the concepts can be generalized to an edge-set A ⊆ E. At first, we define a cut between s and A in G. In the network G, install a new node t A , and for every edge e ∈ A, add a new edge e ′ connected from tail(e) to the new node t A and meanwhile delete the edge e from G. A cut between s and t A is regarded as a cut between s and A in G, but it is necessary to mention that if a cut separating s and t A contains edges in In(t A ), i.e., those installed edges e ′ in In(t A ) which is connected from tail(e) to t A , then all of them should be replaced by the corresponding edges in A. Further, the minimum cut capacity between s and A is defined as the minimum cut capacity between s and t A , and the cuts separating s and A achieving this minimum cut capacity are called the minimum cuts. Furthermore, the following Menger's theorem shows that the maximum number of edge-disjoint paths from node s to node t and the minimum cut capacity between these two nodes are really alternative ways to address the same issue. [29, Theorem 6.7] and [30, Theorem 7.16] 
Theorem 1 (Edge Version of Menger's Theorem ( also see

):
The maximum number of edge-disjoint paths from node s to node t equals the minimum cut capacity between node s and node t.
In defining an n-dimensional (n ≤ C min min t∈T C t ) linear network code (LNC) on G, let In(s) consist of n imaginary incoming channels terminating at the source node s, where we assume that the source message is transmitted to s through them.
Definition 1 (Global Description of A LNC):
An n-dimensional F q -valued LNC on the network G = (V, E) consists of an n-dimensional column vector f e for every channel e ∈ E such that:
1) f e , e ∈ In(s), form the standard basis of the vector space F n q ; 2) For other channels e ∈ E,
where k d,e ∈ F q is the local encoding coefficient for the adjacent channel pair (d, e).
The advantage of network coding is that the full network capacity can be utilized for multicasting information. The source s generates random message M according to an arbitrary distribution on an alphabet M, the message set. We request that the source message M is multicast to every sink node t ∈ T , while being protected from an eavesdropper who can access any wiretap set A in A. Similar to discussions in [1] , [2] for classical wiretap channel models, it is also necessary to randomize the message to combat the eavesdropper [19] for the wiretap network model here. Thus, randomness has to be introduced, which also reduces the throughput inevitably. For this randomness, another random variable K is introduced at the source node, called the key, which takes values in an alphabet K according to the uniform distribution. For a channel e ∈ E, let Y e be the random variable transmitted on the channel e under the random message M and the random key K. Under the sense of information-theoretic security, security is defined formally as follows. Furthermore, we usually choose two positive integers ω and r with n ω + r ≤ C min such that the message M is randomly chosen from F ω q (not necessarily uniformly distributed), while the independent random key K is distributed on F r q uniformly. If an n-dimensional SLNC with output M K over the wiretap set (G, A) can be obtained, then we say that this n-dimensional SLNC on (G, A) is of information rate ω and security redundancy r. Cai and Yeung [19] indicate that if some certain conditions about the wiretap network (G, A) are satisfied (see Theorem 2 below), it is possible to construct a SLNC on (G, A) of information rate ω and security redundancy r.
Theorem 2 ( [19, Theorem 3]):
Let G * = (V * = V, E * ⊆ E) be a subgraph of the network G = (V, E) satisfying the following:
1)
For any sink node t ∈ T , there exist n edge-disjoint paths in G * from the source node s to t;
2)
For any A ∈ A, there are at most r edge-disjoint paths in E * from the source node s to the edges in A.
1
If such a subgraph G * exists, then there is a F q -valued SLNC of security redundancy r and information rate n − r on the wiretap network (G, A), for the base field F q sufficiently large.
Notice the two conditions in the above Theorem 2, which only depend on the network topology, and thus are explicit and easy to check. Next, we will describe the construction in [19] for designing such an ω-rate and r-security-redundancy SLNC on (G, A). In addition, Rouayheb et al. [20] proposed another construction by using secure codes for wiretap channel II, and indicated that their construction is actually equivalent to Cai and Yeung's.
Constuction 1:
1 In other words, consider the collection of edge-sets A * = {A * A ∩ E * : A ∈ A}, and for any A * ∈ A * , there are at most r edge-disjoint paths from s to the edges in A * in G * . Actually, deleting those channels in E \ E * doesn't influence our fundamental communication problem on the network G, and also we can let the messages transmitted on the deleted channels be equal to zero, that is, nothing transmitted on them. Thus, without loss of generality and for ease of discussion, we always let G be such a network satisfying the above 1) and 2) of the smallest size of edge-set E throughout this paper.
Step 1: Choose suitable security redundancy r and information rate ω such that ω + r ≤ C min . Then construct an n ω + r dimensional F q -valued LNC C n on the network G of global encoding kernels f e , e ∈ E, for F q sufficiently large. (e.g. Jaggi et al.'s algorithm [9] );
Step 2: Choose n linearly independent column vectors b 1 , b 2 , · · · , b n ∈ F n q satisfying the secure condition:
for all wiretap-sets A ∈ A. Further define an n × n invertible matrix
Step 3: Let the output m of the source message M be an ω-row vector in F ω q and the output k of the random key K be an r-row vector in F r q . Then the input of the network is x = m k , and subsequently send the pre-encoded input x · Q −1 through the network and apply the LNC C n for network transmission.
This construction designs an ω-rate and r-security-redundancy SLNC over the wiretap network (G, A), and actually, Q −1 · C n {Q −1 · f e : e ∈ E} constitutes a global description of this code. Moreover, for guaranteeing the security, the secure condition (2) must be satisfied for all wiretap sets A ∈ A. Hence, we need to consider all wiretap-sets in order to check the secure condition. This implies a lower bound on the field size which is the number of wiretap-sets in A, i.e., |A|. [19, Theorem 3] ): Let (G, A) be a wiretap network and F q be a finite field with q a prime power. Then there exist F q -valued SLNCs on the wiretap network (G, A) provided that |F q | = q > |A|.
Theorem 3 (also see
For any wiretap set A ∈ A, if it is qualified that |A| = mincut(s, A), the minimum cut capacity between s and A, then we say that the wiretap set A is regular. Further, if every wiretap set A ∈ A is regular, this wiretap-set collection A is said to be regular. For our study on the alphabet size of secure network coding, it suffices to consider the regular case, i.e., the collection A of wiretap sets is regular, because whether the wiretap-set collection A is regular or not doesn't influence our results. For instance, for the result stated in Theorem 3, we assume that the wiretap-set collection A is non-regular, in other words, there exists a wiretap set A ∈ A such that |A| > mincut(s, A). Notice such a fact that, for any edge-set A ⊂ E, the global encoding kernels of channels in A are linear combinations of those global encoding kernels of channels in any cut separating the source node s and the edge-set A. Thus, for any minimum cut CUT A between s and the wiretap set A, it follows that |CUT A | = mincut(s, A) = mincut(s, CUT A ).
Reviewing the secure condition (2) yields that
provided that
Therefore, all non-regular wiretap sets in A can be replaced by their corresponding minimum cuts, all of which are regular. Evidently, this doesn't increase the lower bound in Theorem 3, and instead, sometimes help to decrease the lower bound if fortunately enough (e.g., two different non-regular wiretap sets have a common minimum cut). In fact, the same analysis can be also applied to our results below in the present paper, which will be clear along with the following detailed analysis. Therefore, henceforth we always assume the wiretap-set collection A regular.
III. FIELD SIZES OF SECURE NETWORK CODING
In this section, we still let (G, A) be a wiretap network. In the following, we will give two lower bounds on the required field size for constructing SLNCs over (G, A).
A. The First Lower Bound
At first, we briefly describe our idea about the first lower bound. Review the above Construction 1 of SLNCs, particularly, the secure condition (2) at Step 2. What we are concerned are those vector spaces spanned by global encoding kernels f e , e ∈ A, i.e., f e : e ∈ A for all wiretap sets A ∈ A. Furthermore, notice a fact that in linear network coding, for any channel-set A, all global encoding kernels of channels in A are linear combinations of those global encoding kernels of channels in any cut CUT separating s and A. This subsequently means that the vector space f e : e ∈ A must be a subspace of f e : e ∈ CUT . Particularly, if A ∈ A and CUT is a minimum cut between s and A, then f e : e ∈ A ⊆ f e : e ∈ CUT .
By this observation, the number of different vector spaces amongst all vector spaces f e : e ∈ A for all A ∈ A, instead of the cardinality of A (see Theorem 3), is enough for the above Construction 1. Now, we start to discuss it in detail. At first, let A and A ′ be arbitrary two regular edge-sets in G of the same cardinality, i.e.,
Define a binary relation "∼" between them as: A ∼ A ′ if and only if both A and A ′ have a common minimum cut between the source node s and them. Actually, Guang et al. [23] have indicated that this relation "∼" is an equivalence relation.
Proposition 4 ( [23, Thereom 3]):
The relation "∼" is an equivalence relation. Equivalently, the following three properties are qualified for edge-sets A, A ′ , and A ′′ :
Under this relation, all wiretap sets in A can be divided into different equivalence classes, in other words, the relation "∼" gives a partition of A because of its equivalence property. Certainly, these equivalence classes possibly have different cardinalities. Hence, the number of all equivalence classes in A induced by "∼" forms a new lower bound on the size of the required finite field for the above Construction 1 of SLNCs on (G, A). Firstly, we formally give the definition of equivalence class.
Definition 3 (Equivalence Class):
The equivalence class of a wiretap set A ∈ A induced by the equivalence relation "∼" is defined as a collection of all wiretap sets in A which are equivalent with A.
The equivalence class of A in A is denoted by Cl A (A), or Cl(A) for simplicity by ignoring the subscript since usually the wiretap collection A is assumed to be known.
Now, we present our first lower bound on the field size. Proof: Review Construction 1 of SLNCs in the last section, particularly, Step 2. The key to constructing a SLNC over (G, A) is that n (n C min = ω + r) linearly independent column vectors b 1 , b 2 , · · · , b n in F n q can be selected such that for every wiretap set A in A, it follows
We further notice that for any equivalence class, say Cl, in which all wiretap sets have a common minimum cut denoted by CUT, all global encoding kernels of channels in each wiretap set A ∈ Cl are linear combinations of global encoding kernels of channels in CUT, that is,
Hence, we obtain that, for all A ∈ Cl,
Therefore, if there exist n linearly independent column vectors b i in F n q , 1 ≤ i ≤ n, such that the following is qualified for every equivalence class Cl:
where again CUT represents a common minimum cut of the equivalence class Cl, then we deduce that for all wiretap sets A ∈ A,
In other words, the secure condition is satisfied.
Next, we will show that such n vectors b i , 1 ≤ i ≤ n, can be selected over the field F q provided that the field size
for simplicity, and all N equivalence classes are
As stated above, it suffices to show that for any n-dimensional F q -valued LNC C n of global description { f e : e ∈ E}, we can find n linearly independent column vectors
By induction, we will prove for any index k from 1 to ω, if vectors b 1 , b 2 , · · · , b k−1 have been chosen such that for all CUT i , 1 ≤ i ≤ N , the following equality holds:
Furthermore, notice that such a vector b k exists if and only if
So we just need to prove that this set is nonempty provided q > N . Further, one has
where the last inequality (4) follows from |CUT i | ≤ r for all 1 ≤ i ≤ N due to the assumption that the wiretap network (G, A) satisfies the conditions 1) and 2) in Theorem 2. Subsequently,
where the inequality (5) follows from k ≤ ω and the last inequality (6) follows from q > N . Hence, the desired column vectors b k , 1 ≤ k ≤ ω, can be chosen one by one provided that the field size
We accomplish the proof.
For this obtained lower bound in Theorem 5, easily see that it is better than the previous result stated in Theorem 3. Actually, this bound is much better unless the wiretap-set collection A is rare, in which perhaps every wiretap set forms an equivalence class as an extreme. For example in Fig. 1 below, if the wiretapper has capability of eavesdropping any one edge, i.e., A = {e i } : 1 ≤ e ≤ 9 , then by Theorem 5 all equivalence classes are Cl 1 = {e 1 }, {e 4 }, {e 5 } , Cl 2 = {e 2 }, {e 6 }, {e 7 } , and
Cl 3 = {e 3 }, {e 8 }, {e 9 } , and thus the field size larger than 3 is enough for constructing a SLNC on (G 3,2 , A), which is smaller than the previous result |A| = 9. But if the wiretap-set collection A rare, e.g., A = {e 4 }, {e 7 }, {e 8 } , then it easily see that N (A) = |A| = 3 since each equivalence class among A just contains one wiretap-set, that is, Cl 1 = {e 4 } , Cl 2 = {e 7 } , and Cl 3 = {e 8 } . However, for this rare case, we sometimes can find simpler approaches to guarantee the security, and meanwhile achieve the maximum information rate. For instance, we can always set that nothing is transmitted on e 4 , e 7 , and e 9 in this example, which is equivalent to deleting them from the network.
In addition, we consider a special case that the wiretap-set collection A contains all edge-subsets of size not larger than a fixed number r, in other words, the wiretapper can fully access an arbitrary edge-set of cardinality not larger than r. The lower bound in Theorem 5 restricted to the special case degenerates to the main conclusion in [23] , which is much smaller than the previous results. To be specific, for this special case, Rouayheb et al. [20] also proposed a so-called SLIF algorithm for constructing SLNCs by modifying the LIF algorithm in [9] . Although their construction is equivalent to Cai and Yeung's in [19] , their bounds on the required field size are in general smaller than Cai and Yeung's result |E| r . Concretely, their lower bounds are
+ |T |, which are still combinatorial numbers. Hence, it is easily conceivable that our bound for this special case is much smaller. We refer the reader to [23] for a detailed discussion of the above. For more general cases, we further give an example to illustrate our result and compare with others.
Example 1:
In this example, we take combination networks (see [13, p.26 and evidently the minimum cut capacity between s and every sink node is 8. The Fig. 1 Furthermore, we divide all channels in E into two layers: upper layer and lower layer. The upper layer contains all channels between s and internal nodes, and thus there are total 10 channels in this layer.
In contrast, the lower layer consists of all channels between internal nodes and sink nodes, and total |T | · k = 45 × 8 = 360 channels in this layer. For the combination network G 3,2 (see Fig. 1 ), the upper layer contains 3 channels e i , 1 ≤ i ≤ 3, and the lower layer consists of 6 channels e j , 4 ≤ j ≤ 9.
Next, assume that a wiretapper can eavesdrop none of channels in the upper layer and at most 6 channels in the lower layer, and all of them come from arbitrary but different internal nodes. The collection A of wiretap sets contains all such possibilities. Next, we will count the number of wiretap sets in A.
Firstly, enumerate the number of wiretap sets of cardinality 6. For any wiretap set of size 6, since its all 6 channels come from different internal nodes, together with the fact that the number of outgoing channels of every internal node is
= 36, the number of wiretap sets of cardinality 6 is i . Consequently, the number of wiretap sets is
On the other hand, we compute the number N (A) of equivalence classes. For any two wiretap sets A 1 and A 2 of the same cardinality i, 1 ≤ i ≤ 6, it is easy to see that both are equivalent if and only if the channels in A 1 or A 2 are from the same i internal nodes, i.e., {tail(d) :
because both of them are equivalent to the edge-set
layer. For example in G 3,2 , the edge-sets A 1 = {e 4 , e 6 } and A 2 = {e 5 , e 7 } are of the same cardinality 2 and the channels in every one come from the same 2 internal nodes i 1 and i 2 . Specifically, both edges e 4 and e 5 are leading from i 1 and both edges e 6 and e 7 come from i 2 , that is, {i 1 = tail(e 4 ), i 2 = tail(e 6 )} = {i 1 = tail(e 5 ), i 2 = tail(e 7 )}. Now, return to the network G 10, 8 . It is not difficult to obtain that the number N (A) of equivalence classes respect to the wiretap network (G 10,8 , A) equals to
10 i = 847, which further means that, for constructing a SLNC on the wiretap network (G 10,8 , A) , the field size larger than 847 is enough, much smaller than the previous result |A| ≈ 4.7×10 11 .
However, by further observation in this example, for any two wiretap sets A 1 and A 2 with |A 1 | < |A 2 |, if A 1 ⊂ A 2 or, more generally, the set of internal nodes connective with channels in A 1 is contained by the set of those internal nodes connective with channels in A 2 , the SLNCs over (G 10, 8 , A) by Construction 1 must satisfy that this code is secure for the wiretap set A 1 , provided that it is secure for all wiretap sets in the equivalence class Cl(A 2 ). We still take the combination network G 3,2 into account as before.
Let two wiretap sets be A 1 = {e 4 } and A 2 = {e 5 , e 6 }, respectively. Notice that A 2 is equivalent to the edge-set A = {e 1 , e 2 }, that is also a common minimum cut separating all wiretap sets in Cl(A 2 ) from the source node s. Thus, if a SLNC is secure for A, i.e., I(M ; Y A ) = 0 by Definition 2, of course secure for A 2 , then this SLNC is also secure for the wiretap set A 1 , because the transmitted message Y A1 = Y e4 is transformed linearly by Y A = (Y e1 , Y e2 ). Motivated by the above observations, it is conceivable that the field size may be reduced further, which will be explored and discussed in the following.
B. The Second Lower Bound
As mentioned at the end of Example 1 in the last section, it seems that possibly the field size for constructing SLNCs on the wiretap network (G, A) can be reduced further by an observation to different equivalence classes. To establish accurate mathematical theory, we first introduce several concepts below.
Definition 4 (Domination)
words, there exists a minimum cut between s and A 2 such that, after deleting it, s and A 1 are no more connected.
For this binary relation of domination, we have the following proposition.
Proposition 6: For any two regular wiretap sets A 1 and A 2 of cardinalities respectively r 1 and r 2 , A 1 can be dominated by A 2 , i.e., A 1 ≺ A 2 , if and only if the minimum cut capacity between s and the edge-set A 1 ∪ A 2 is equal to r 2 , the same as the minimum cut capacity between s and A 2 , that is,
Proof: By the above Definition 4 of the domination between wiretap sets, the necessity is evident. So it suffices to show the sufficiency. Since mincut(s, A 1 ∪ A 2 ) = r 2 , let CUT be a minimum cut separating A 1 ∪ A 2 from s, and |CUT| = r 2 . Furthermore, notice that CUT of course is a cut between s and A i , i = 1, 2, and particularly, a minimum cut between s and A 2 . Therefore, we deduce a minimum cut CUT between s and A 2 , which also separates A 1 from s, that is, A 1 ≺ A 2 , which completes the proof. 
Before giving the proof of the theorem, we need the following lemma.
Lemma 8: Let A 1 , A 2 , · · · , A n be n equivalent regular edge-sets. Then for every j, 1 ≤ j ≤ n,
Proof: We will prove the result by induction on n. Clearly, the lemma is trivial for the case n = 1.
Thus, we just consider the cases n ≥ 2.
that is, A 1 and A 2 have a common minimum cut, say CUT, it follows that
which shows mincut(s,
Now, we assume that it is true for the case n − 1, that is, mincut(s, ∪
Then, we focus on the case n. By the hypothesis of the case n − 1, we have
Let further CUT be a minimum cut between s and ∪ n−1 i=1 A i , and thus
It is easily seen that CUT ∼ A i for all 1 ≤ i ≤ n − 1. Together with A i ∼ A n for all 1 ≤ i ≤ n − 1, it follows that CUT ∼ A n by the transitivity property of the relation "∼" (see Proposition 4) . As discussed before, we further obtain mincut(s, CUT ∪ A n ) = r.
In other words, for CUT and A n , there is a common minimum cut, say CUT * , and
Furthermore, because CUT * is a cut separating both CUT and A n from s, then CUT * also separates
and equivalently,
which completes the proof.
Proof of Theorem 7:
First, we assume that Cl(A 1 ) ≺ Cl(A 2 ). By the definition of class domination (see Definition 5), let CUT be a common minimum cut between s and all edge-sets in Cl(A 2 ), which can also separate all edge-sets in Cl(A 1 ) from s. In particular, for every A ′ 1 ∈ Cl(A 1 ) and A ′ 2 ∈ Cl(A 2 ), CUT is a cut separating both A ′ 2 and A ′ 1 from s, which indicates that CUT is a cut of A ′ 1 ∪ A ′ 2 . Hence, we obtain that
which accomplishes the proof of the necessity.
For sufficiency, we first let CUT be a common minimum cut of Cl(A 2 ), which clearly means
In addition, every minimum cut between s and A ′ 1 ∪ A ′ 2 must be a cut between s and A ′ 2 , which, together with mincut(s,
, implies that every minimum cut between s and A ′ 1 ∪ A ′ 2 is actually a minimum cut between s and A ′ 2 . Define MinCut(B) as the collection of all minimum cuts between s and an edge-subset B. As discussed above,
. Applying Lemma 8, we further deduce
Consequently, there exists a cut of cardinality r 2 , say CUT * , which separates s and all A ′ 1 ∈ Cl(A 1 ), and also separates s and all A ′ 2 ∈ Cl(A 2 ). Hence, CUT * is a common minimum cut between s and all edge-sets in Cl(A 2 ), which meanwhile separates all edge-sets in Cl(A 1 ) from s. This indicates that Cl(A 1 ) ≺ Cl(A 2 ) by Definition 5 of the class-domination relation "≺". We accomplish the proof.
In the following, we will show that the class-domination relation "≺" is a partial order, which is very important and useful to reduce the field size further by applying our proposed idea. Firstly, we set that an equivalence class cannot dominate itself. Then we deduce the following result. In order to prove this theorem, we need the following lemma.
Lemma 10: Let A 1 and A 2 be two regular edge-sets, and A 1 ≺ A 2 . Then for any CUT 1 ∈ MinCut(A 1 ) and any CUT 2 ∈ MinCut(A 1 ∪ A 2 ), it follows that
Proof: Let CUT 1 ∈ MinCut(A 1 ) and CUT 2 ∈ MinCut(A 1 ∪ A 2 ) be two edge-sets, that is, CUT 1 is a minimum cut between s and A 1 and CUT 2 is a minimum cut between s and A 1 ∪ A 2 . At first, easily see that the result is trivial for the case CUT 1 ≺ CUT 2 . Next, we will consider the other case
Since two edge-sets A 1 and A 2 are regular, and
it follows that
and, together with A 1 ≺ A 2 and Proposition 6,
Certainly, r 1 < r 2 . In addition, note that each cut between s and CUT 1 ∪ CUT 2 must separates A 1 ∪ A 2 from s, which implies that
Thus, it suffices to show mincut(s,
Assume the contrary that mincut(s, CUT 1 ∪ CUT 2 ) r > r 2 . Then there must exist r edge-disjoint paths from s to CUT 1 ∪ CUT 2 , say P 1 , P 2 , · · · , P r , such that each path passes through exact one edge in CUT 1 ∪ CUT 2 as its last edge. Actually, for any r edge-disjoint paths from s to CUT 1 ∪ CUT 2 , their r last edges must fall into CUT 1 ∪ CUT 2 , but further, if one path of them passes through more than one edge in CUT 1 ∪ CUT 2 , we can choose its subpath from s to the first edge in CUT 1 ∪ CUT 2 to replace itself, and thus this new path is still edge-disjoint with others and passes through exact one edge in CUT 1 ∪ CUT 2 as its last edge.
Subsequently, we assume that out of the r edge-disjoint paths P 1 , P 2 , · · · , P r there are a (a ≤ r 1 ) paths whose last edges fall into CUT 1 \ CUT 2 , and for the remaining r − a paths, their r − a last edges fall into CUT 2 . Without loss of generality, let the former a paths be P 1 , P 2 , · · · , P a and the latter r − a paths be P a+1 , P a+2 , · · · , P r , and furthermore, let the last edges of the first a paths P 1 , P 2 , · · · , P a be e 1 , e 2 , · · · , e a , respectively, all of which fall into CUT 1 \ CUT 2 , and the last edges of the remaining r − a paths P a+1 , P a+2 , · · · , P r be e a+1 , e a+2 , · · · , e r , respectively, which fall into CUT 2 . In addition, let
In(CUT 2 ) = {e a+1 , e a+2 , · · · , e r } ⊆ CUT 2 ,
and thus clearly,
On the other hand, since the edge-set CUT 1 is a minimum cut between s and A 1 , and A 1 is regular, i.e.,
, there are r 1 edge-disjoint paths from CUT 1 to A 1 , beginning with all r 1 different edges in CUT 1 and ending with all r 1 different edges in A 1 . Denote these r 1 paths by P ′ 1 , P ′ 2 , · · · , P ′ r1 , and without loss of generality to assume that P ′ 1 , P ′ 2 , · · · , P ′ a begin with e 1 , e 2 , · · · , e a in In(CUT 1 ), respectively. Thus, we claim that P i ∩ P ′ i = {e i } for all 1 ≤ i ≤ a. Otherwise, contradict to the fact that the network G is acyclic. Next, we further claim that P ′ i ∩ CUT 2 = ∅ for all 1 ≤ i ≤ a. Conversely, assume that P ′ i ∩ CUT 2 = ∅ for some i, 1 ≤ i ≤ a. Together with the fact that the path P i from s to e i doesn't contain any edge in CUT 1 ∪ CUT 2 except e i in CUT 1 , P i ∪ P ′ i constitutes a path from s to A 1 not passing through CUT 2 , which contradicts to CUT 2 being a cut between s and A 1 . Therefore, for all 1 ≤ i ≤ a, we have
Moreover, we further indicate that it is impossible that P ′ i ∩ Out(CUT 2 ) = ∅ for any 1 ≤ i ≤ a. Conversely, let P ′ i ∩ Out(CUT 2 ) = ∅ for some i, 1 ≤ i ≤ a. In other words, P ′ i doesn't pass through Out(CUT 2 ). In addition, it is necessary to notice that P ′ i doesn't pass through CUT 1 except e i , ether. Together with the condition (9), it follows that P ′ i must pass through In(CUT 2 ) \ CUT 1 . Consider such an edge, which is the last edge in In(CUT 2 ) \ CUT 1 passed through by P ′ i , say e a+1 without loss of generality. Thus, the subpath of P ′ i between e a+1 and A 1 doesn't pass through any edge in CUT 1 ∪CUT 2 except e a+1 . In addition, review that the path P a+1 from s to CUT 1 ∪CUT 2 doesn't pass through any edge in CUT 1 ∪ CUT 2 except e a+1 , either. Further, recall that e a+1 / ∈ CUT 1 from e a+1 ∈ In(CUT 2 ) \ CUT 1 .
Thus, concatenating P a+1 and the subpath of P ′ i between e a+1 and A 1 yields a path from s to A 1 not passing through CUT 1 . This contradicts to the fact that CUT 1 is a minimum cut between s and A 1 .
Therefore, for all 1 ≤ i ≤ a, it follows
Furthermore, since P ′ i , 1 ≤ i ≤ a, are edge-disjoint, and each P ′ i passes through at least one edge in Out(CUT 2 ) from (10), we have |Out(CUT 2 )| ≥ a, or equivalently, |In(CUT 2 )| ≤ r 2 − a. Together with |In(CUT 1 )| = a, it follows that |In(CUT 1 )| + |In(CUT 2 )| ≤ a + r 2 − a = r 2 < r, which contradicts to the equation (8) . Thus, our hypothesis is not true, and we have mincut(s, CUT 1 ∪ CUT 2 ) = r 2 , completing the proof. Now, we can give the proof of Theorem 9.
Proof of Theorem 9:
By the setting that every equivalence class doesn't dominate itself, easily see the irreflexivity, i.e., Cl 1 ⊀ Cl 1 . Hence, it suffices to show transitivity property of the class-domination relation "≺", that is, for any three classes Cl 1 , Cl 2 , and Cl 3 , if Cl 1 ≺ Cl 2 and Cl 2 ≺ Cl 3 , then Cl 1 ≺ Cl 3 .
By Theorem 7, it is sufficient to prove mincut(s, A 1 ∪ A 3 ) = mincut(s, A 3 ) r 3 for all A 1 ∈ Cl 1 and all A 3 ∈ Cl 3 . First, note that every cut separating A 1 ∪ A 3 from s is also a cut between s and A 3 , and
On the other hand, in view of Cl 1 ≺ Cl 2 and Cl 2 ≺ Cl 3 , let CUT ′ be a common minimum cut of Cl 2 such that it is also a common cut of Cl 1 , and similarly, CUT ′′ be a common minimum cut of Cl 3 meanwhile separating all edge-sets in Cl 2 . Then, one has mincut(s, CUT ′ ) = |CUT ′ | r 2 , and mincut(s, CUT ′′ ) = |CUT ′′ | r 3 .
Further, we consider the edge-set CUT ′ ∪ CUT ′′ , and notice the fact that every cut between s and CUT ′ ∪ CUT ′′ is able to separate all A 1 ∪ A 2 ∪ A 3 and s for any A i ∈ Cl i , i = 1, 2, 3. This implies that
Subsequently, applying Lemma 10, we deduce
Combining the above equations (11), (12), and (13), we deduce mincut(s, A 1 ∪A 3 ) = r 3 for all A 1 ∈ Cl 1 and all A 3 ∈ Cl 3 , which accomplishes the proof.
Therefore, the above Theorem 9 shows that the class-domination relation "≺" is a strict partial order and so the collection of all equivalence classes in A is a strict partially ordered set. Thus, we can define maximal equivalence class in A, the number of which induces a smaller bound. 4 Further, the number of maximal equivalence classes is dominated by N max (A).
In the following, we still take a combination network as an example to illustrate the above discussion.
Example 2:
The network G 4,3 depicted in Fig. 2 is a combination network with parameters N = 4
and k = 3. Further let the collection A of wiretap sets be: Since the class-domination binary relation "≺" is a strict partial order, the strict partially ordered set of all equivalence classes can be presented by a corresponding Hasse diagram illustrated by Fig. 3 , and it is easily seen that the equivalence classes Cl 1,2,3 , Cl 1,2,4 , and Cl 3,4 are all 3 maximal elements in the strict partially ordered set, or maximal equivalence classes, and N max (A) = 3. Now, we will present our second lower bound on the field size for constructing SLNCs, which is further smaller than the first one in Theorem 5.
Theorem 11: Let (G, A) be a wiretap network and F q be a finite field with q a prime power. Then there exist F q -valued SLNCs over the wiretap network (G, A) provided that the field size |F q | = q > N max (A).
Next, we will continue using the combination network G 10, 8 in Example 1 to show this new bound, and conveniently to compare with the other results.
Example 3:
Reviewing the wiretap network (G, A) in Example 1, the wiretapper can eavesdrop at most 6 channels at the lower layer and all of them come from different and arbitrary internal nodes.
Further, note that wiretap sets of the same cardinality belong to the same equivalence class if and only if the channels in every wiretap set are connective with the same internal nodes, in other words, the set of their tail nodes corresponding to the channels in every wiretap set is the same. Thus, by the definition of the class domination (see Definition 5), a small-cardinality equivalence class can be dominated by a big-cardinality one if and only if the set of tail nodes with respect to the former equivalence class is a subset of the set of tail nodes with respect to the later one (closely similar to Example 2, e.g.,
Thus, it is easy to see that all the maximal equivalence classes are those ones of cardinality 6, which implies that the number of them is 10 6 = 210, i.e., N max (A) = 210. Therefore, the field size larger than 210 is enough for constructing a SLNC over the wiretap network (G 10,8 , A), which is further smaller than our first lower bound 847.
IV. EFFICIENTLY DETERMINING ALGORITHMS FOR THE LOWER BOUNDS
In the last section, we have proposed two new and better lower bounds for constructing SLNCs over a wiretap network (G, A). However, for explicit constructions of SLNCs on (G, A), how to efficiently determine the obtained lower bounds is also a very meaningful and important problem. Motivated by a desire to develop methods with low complexity and empirical behavior to solve this problem, in this section we focus on efficient algorithms for determining them.
A. Preparations
Similarly, we still let G = (V, E) be a finite acyclic directed network with the single source s, and let t represent a non-source node in G.
Definition 7:
The primary minimum cut in G between s and t is defined as a minimum cut separating t from s such that, after deleting all edges in this minimum cut, the source node s and any other minimum cut between s and t are disconnected.
In the following, we will show the existence and the uniqueness of primary minimum cut, which hence indicates that its definition is well-defined. Before discussing further, we need some preparations first. Since the considered network G is acyclic, following the direction of the edges in G, there is an upstream-to-downstream order (ancestral topological order) on the edges in E which is consistent with the naturally partial order of all edges.
Recall the following lemma from [23] , which shows that the above definition is reasonable.
Lemma 12 ( [23, Lemma 4]):
Let G = (V, E) be a finite acyclic directed network with unit capacity edges and the single source s. Let t be a non-source node and the minimum cut capacity between s and t be n. Then arbitrary n edge-disjoint paths from s to t pass through all minimum cuts between s and t, and n different edges in each minimum cut are on n different paths respectively.
Next, we give several propositions on this binary relation in Definition 8, which show that the relation is well-defined, and are useful for the further discussion. Herein, we use MinCut(t) to denote the set of all minimum cuts between s and t.
Proposition 13: Let CUT 1 and CUT 2 be two minimum cuts in MinCut(t). Then CUT 1 ≤ CUT 2 , if and only if CUT 1 is a cut separating CUT 2 from s. Particularly, s and CUT 2 are not connected any more provided deleting CUT 1 .
Proof:
The sufficiency is trivial. For necessity, we first review that CUT 1 = {e 1,i , 1 ≤ i ≤ n} and CUT 2 = {e 2,i , 1 ≤ i ≤ n}, and P 1 , P 2 , · · · , P n are n edge-disjoint paths from s to t qualifying that P i passes through e 1,i and e 2,i in order for 1 ≤ i ≤ n due to CUT 1 ≤ CUT 2 . Next, we will accomplish the proof by contradiction. Assume the contrary that CUT 1 is not a cut between s and CUT 2 , in other words, after deleting CUT 1 in G, there still exists a path, say P , from s to CUT 2 . Without loss of generality, this path P is assumed from s to e 2,1 . Certainly, the path P passes through no edges in the subpath of P 1 from head(e 2,1 ) to t. Otherwise, there is a cycle. Further, concatenate the path P and the subpath of P 1 from head(e 2,1 ) to t, which yields a new path from s to t not passing through CUT 1 . By Lemma 12, this contradicts to the fact CUT 1 being a minimum cut between s and t. We complete the proof.
Proposition 14:
Let CUT 1 and CUT 2 be two minimum cuts in MinCut(t) and CUT 1 ≤ CUT 2 . Then for arbitrary n edge-disjoint paths from s to t, every path out of them always passes through one edge in CUT 1 prior and then passes through one edge in CUT 2 posterior. In other words, the order of the two minimum cuts is independent of the choice of edge-disjoint paths.
Proof: Assume the contrary that there exist n edge-disjoint paths from s to t, denoted by P 1 , P 2 , · · · , P n , such that one path out of them, say P 1 without loss of generality, passes through one edge e 2 in CUT 2 prior and then passes through one edge e 1 in CUT 1 posterior. Since both CUT 1 and CUT 2 are minimum cuts between s and t, arbitrary n edge-disjoint paths from s to t always satisfy that each path of them passes through different and thus exact one edge in CUT i by Lemma 12, i = 1, 2. Particularly, the paths P 1 , P 2 , · · · , P n pass through different edges in CUT i , i = 1, 2. Thus, the path P 1 can be divided into three parts: the part from s to tail(e 2 ), the part from e 2 to e 1 , and the part from head(e 1 ) to t. Further note that the first and third parts, i.e., the part from s to tail(e 2 ) and the part from head(e 1 ) to t, contain no edges in CUT 1 ∪ CUT 2 . This means that when removing CUT 1 , there is still a path from s to CUT 2 , i.e., the part of P 1 from s to e 2 . Hence, this leads to a contradiction to the necessity of Proposition 13, that is, CUT 1 is a cut between s and CUT 2 provided CUT 1 ≤ CUT 2 , which accomplishes the proof. Now, under the above preparations, we start to discuss the existence and the uniqueness of primary minimum cut. First, we will focus on the existence of primary minimum cut. Since the network G is a finite digraph, the number of minimum cuts between s and t must be finite, i.e. |MinCut(t)| < +∞.
Together with the fact that all minimum cuts in MinCut(t) are equivalent under equivalence relation "∼", it follows by Lemma 8 in the last section, that mincut(s, ∪ CUT∈MinCut(t) CUT) = mincut(s, t).
Further, let CUT * denote a minimum cut between s and ∪ CUT∈MinCut(t) CUT, and obviously by (14)
It is easily seen that CUT * must be a minimum cut between s and t, i.e., CUT * ∈ MinCut(t). Therefore, CUT * is a primary minimum cut between s and t according to Definition 7, which shows that primary minimum cut always exists.
Next, we will show its uniqueness. Assume the contrary that there are two distinct primary minimum cuts between s and t, denoted by CUT * 1 and CUT * 2 , respectively. Further, let CUT * 1 = {e * 1,i , 1 ≤ i ≤ n} and CUT from s to t satisfying that the path P i passes both e * 1,i in CUT * 1 and e * 2,i in CUT * 2 , 1 ≤ i ≤ n by Lemma 12. Define a new edge-set CUT * = {e * i = minord(e * 1,i , e * 2,i ), 1 ≤ i ≤ n}, where
Review Lemma 5 in [23] below.
Lemma 15 ( [23, Lemma 5] ): Let P 1 , P 2 , · · · , P n be n edge-disjoint paths from s to t, and CUT 1 = {e 1,i : 1 ≤ i ≤ n} and CUT 2 = {e 2,i : 1 ≤ i ≤ n} be two minimum cuts between s and t with e 1,i and e 2,i on the path P i for 1 ≤ i ≤ n. Then CUT = {minord(e 1,i , e 2,i ) : 1 ≤ i ≤ n} is still a minimum cut between s and t.
By this lemma, the above CUT * is also a minimum cut between s and t, and satisfies CUT * ≤ CUT * i for i = 1, 2. Furthermore, by Proposition 13 above, CUT * is a minimum cut between s and CUT * i , i = 1, 2. We also have either CUT * = CUT * 1 or CUT * = CUT * 2 because of the hypothesis that CUT * and CUT
Theorem 18:
The binary relation "≤" amongst all minimum cuts between s and t is a (non-strict) partial order, that is, the following three conditions are satisfied for any minimum cuts CUT 1 , CUT 2 , and CUT 3 in MinCut(t):
2) (Antisymmetry) if CUT 1 ≤ CUT 2 and CUT 2 ≤ CUT 1 , then CUT 1 = CUT 2 ;
3) (Transitivity) if CUT 1 ≤ CUT 2 and CUT 2 ≤ CUT 3 , then CUT 1 ≤ CUT 3 .
From the relation "≤" between edges, the reflexivity property 1) is apparent, i.e., CUT 1 ≤ CUT 1 for every CUT 1 ∈ MinCut(t). For Antisymmetry 2), we need the following lemma necessarily, which is a simple corollary of Proposition 13.
Lemma 19: For any two minimum cuts CUT 1 and
CUT 1 is a minimum cut between s and CUT 2 .
Proof: At first, note that if it is a cut between s and CUT 2 , then CUT 1 must be minimum. Hence, it suffices to prove that CUT 1 is a cut between s and CUT 2 . Furthermore, Proposition 13 has showed this point. We complete the proof.
Since both CUT 1 ≤ CUT 2 and CUT 2 ≤ CUT 1 , together with Lemma 19, it follows that CUT 1 is a minimum cut of CUT 2 and reversely CUT 2 is also a minimum cut of CUT 1 , which easily leads to CUT 1 = CUT 2 , which proves Antisymmetry 2).
To obtain the transitivity property 3), we will discuss the following two cases: Case 1. Assume that at least two out of the three minimum cuts are the same. For this case, the transitivity is trivial.
Case 2. All three minimum cuts are different. Since CUT 1 ≤ CUT 2 and CUT 2 ≤ CUT 3 , by Lemma 19, CUT 1 is a minimum cut separating CUT 2 from s and similarly CUT 2 is a minimum cut separating CUT 3 from s, which implies that CUT 1 is also a minimum cut separating CUT 3 from s. Thus, we claim that CUT 1 ≤ CUT 3 by Proposition 13. This proves the transitivity for this case.
To solve our problem, the concept of primary minimum cut between the source node s and a nonsource node t is generalized naturally and easily to that between the source node s and a wiretap set A ∈ A, which is closely similar to the generalization of the concept of cut from the cut between s and t to that between s and an edge-subset A as stated before in Section II. To be specific, we still install a new node t A for the wiretap set A, add a new edge e ′ for every edge e ∈ A which is connected from tail(e) to the new node t A , and meanwhile delete the edge e. Thus the primary minimum cut between s and t A is regarded as the primary minimum cut between s and A. Necessarily, if the primary minimum cut between s and t A contains edges in In(t A ), then these edges should be replaced by the corresponding ones in A. Hence, the primary minimum cut between the source node and an edge-subset is equivalent to that between the source node and a non-source node. All results on the primary minimum cut between two nodes are still tenable for that between a node and an edge-subset. Thus, there exists a minimum cut, say CUT * , separating both CUT and CUT ′ from s, that is, CUT * ≤ CUT and CUT * ≤ CUT ′ by Proposition 13. Subsequently, CUT * is also a minimum cut between s and A. Recall that CUT is the primary minimum cut between s and A, which implies that CUT ≤ CUT * .
Combining the above, we derive CUT = CUT * by the antisymmetry property in Theorem 18. Similarly, we also have CUT ′ = CUT * . Therefore, CUT = CUT ′ . Now, we start to discuss the conclusion 2). Since Cl(A) ≻ Cl(B), there exists a common minimum cut CUT ′′ of all edge-sets in Cl(A) separating every edge-set in Cl(B) from s. By the proved conclusion 1) in this theorem, we have known that the primary minimum cut CUT is also a common minimum cut of all edge-sets in Cl(A). Thus, it follows that CUT ∼ CUT ′′ by Proposition 4. Furthermore, because mincut(s, CUT ∪ CUT ′′ ) = r by Lemma 8, there exists a common minimum cut, say CUT * , separating both CUT and CUT ′′ from s. Particularly, CUT * is a minimum cut between s and CUT, which, together with the primary property of CUT, implies that CUT = CUT * . Therefore, CUT is a minimum cut of CUT ′′ , and of course separates all edge-sets in Cl(B). This completes the proof.
B. Algorithms
Under the above preparations, we will give approaches to enumerate the number N max (A) of maximal equivalence classes. One crucial step is to find primary minimum cuts. Thus, after describing the algorithms, we will give how to efficiently find primary minimum cuts.
Consider the collection Z of all equivalence classes in A, and for any A ∈ A, there are at most r edge-disjoint paths in E from s to the edges in A. First, since all wiretap sets are considered to be regular, all equivalence classes of maximum cardinality r are maximal. Thus, a naive and cumbersome approach is that for every such maximal equivalence class Cl, find its primary minimum cut and further from Z delete those equivalence classes which can be separated from s by this primary minimum cut, including
Cl. After that, in the remaining collection Z, again find all equivalence classes of maximum cardinality (strictly less than r right now). Clearly, they are also maximal equivalence classes. Repeat this process until the collection Z empty. Then, we determine the number N max (A) of maximal equivalence classes.
The following Algorithm 1 specifies the pseudo-code of the stated approach.
However, Using this algorithm, we first have to determine all equivalence classes in A. Actually, it is conceivable that this work is not easy to do and will cost a plenty of computational complexity.
Thus, we proposed an improved algorithm, which bypasses equivalence classes and directly considers the collection A of wiretap sets. To be specific, arbitrarily choose a wiretap set A ∈ A of maximum cardinality, and subsequently find its primary minimum cut, say CUT. By Theorem 20, we know that the cut CUT is the primary minimum cut for all A ′ ∈ Cl(A), and also separates all B ′ in Cl(B) from s provided that Cl(A) ≻ Cl(B). Thus, we can partition the edge set E into two parts: E CUT and E c CUT = E \E CUT , where E CUT is the set of edges reachable from the source node s after deleting CUT, and evidently, the set E c CUT contains all edges not reachable from s after deleting CUT, and the edges in CUT. And E = E CUT ∪ E c CUT . Furthermore, this step of partition can be implemented efficiently by slightly modifying the original search algorithms of the directed graph, which will be presented in detail below. For this partition of the edge-set E, it is not difficult to see that the wiretap sets, which are either equivalent to A or dominated by any wiretap set in Cl(A), fall into the edge-set E c CUT . Thus, we can remove them from A. Repeating this process until A empty, we determine the number N max (A) of maximal equivalence classes in A. The following Algorithm 2 lists the pseudo-code of this improved approach.
Next, we will consider how to obtain the partition E = E CUT ∪ E c CUT , which, as mentioned above, Return N max (A).
end
can be solved to search all edges reachable from the source node s, consisting of the edge-subset E CUT .
In the following, we will show that it can be implemented efficiently by slightly modifying the original search algorithms of the directed graph. The basic idea of search algorithms is to find all nodes in a network G = (V, E) that are reachable along directed paths from the source node s. We just need an additional storage to record all edges in E CUT when running search algorithms. The following Algorithm 3 gives a formal description of the search algorithm. When the algorithm terminates, it has marked all the nodes in G that are connected from the source node s via a directed path, and outputs the set of edges connected from the source node s. In addition, the predecessor indices define a tree containing all node marked nodes, which is referred to a search tree. Algorithm 3, as described, doesn't specify the manner for examining the nodes or for adding the nodes to LIST. Different rules give rise to different search techniques. Two data structures, queue and stack, are the most popular for maintaining LIST, which further induce two fundamental search strategies: breadthfirst search and depth-first search, respectively. If we maintain the node-set LIST as a queue, we always select nodes from the front of LIST and add them to the rear. In this case the search algorithm selects end the marked nodes in a first-in, first-out order. Therefore, this version of search is called a breadth-first search and the resulting search tree is a breadth-first search tree. In contrast, if we maintain the node-set LIST as a stack, we always select the nodes from the front of LIST and also add them to the front.
In this case the search algorithm selects the marked node in a last-in, first-out order. It performs a deep probe, creating a path as long as possible, and backs up one node to initiate a new probe when it can mark no new node from the tip of the path. Consequently, we call this version of search a depth-first search and the resulting tree a depth-first search tree.
In addition, no matter which data structure would be used, it is easy to show that the search algorithm for a network G = (V, E) runs in O(|E|) time [29] . For our case that the primary minimum cut CUT between s and some wiretap set A is removed from the network G, the search algorithm (Algorithm 3)
can find out the set E CUT of edges reachable from s and runs in O(|E CUT |) time.
So far the remaining question is how to efficiently find out primary minimum cuts. Fortunately, we Return the edge-set SET.
end discover that the maximum-flow algorithms in digraph theory are able to help determine the primary minimum cuts efficiently. The maximum flow problem -determining the maximum flow of a digraph -is very important and has a variety of applications in practice [29] , [30] . This problem was introduced firstly by Ford and Fulkerson in the seminal paper [31] . In 1956, Ford and Fulkerson [31] , and, Elias, Feinstein, and Shannon [32] independently solved this problem by augmenting path algorithms, and moreover established the celebrated max-flow min-cut theorem, which further implies that the maximum flow problem and the minimum cut problem are equivalent. The maximum flow problem is distinguished by the long succession of research contributions (perhaps no other network flow problems have witnessed as many incremental improvements) and a plenty of algorithms are proposed to improve on the complexity, particularly, the worst-case complexity. Next, we will consider a generic augmenting path algorithm for solving our problem, and particularly, when the algorithm terminates, it has obtained a minimum cut, which is able to be proved as a primary minimum cut. At first, we list the pseudo-code of this algorithm in Algorithm 4 below.
Remark 21:
In the Generic Augmenting Path Algorithm (Algorithm 4), the path, we consider herein, may not be at the same direction, and if the edge e on the path P is directed from s to t, this edge e is called a forward edge; and otherwise, the edge e is called a backward edge.
In the following, we will show that the output edge-set CUT of Algorithm 4 is the primary minimum cut between s and t.
Theorem 22: Let f and CUT be the flow and the edge-set outputted from the Generic Augmenting Path Algorithm 4, respectively. Then f is a maximum flow and CUT is the primary minimum cut between s and t.
Proof: At first, we have known that the output flow f is maximum and the output edge-set CUT is a minimum cut between s and t (see [29, Chapter 6.5] and [30, Chapter 7.2] ). So it suffices to prove that the minimum cut CUT is primary. For notation simplicity, let n denote the minimum cut capacity between s and t which equals to the value v(f ) of the maximum flow f , i.e., n = v(f ). Since the network G is unit-capacity, the maximum flow f can be decomposed into n edge-disjoint (directed) paths, say P 1 , P 2 , · · · , P n , and each one out of them passes through different and exact one edge in CUT by Lemma 12. Now we assume the contrary that CUT is not primary. Let CUT ′ be the primary minimum cut by its existence and uniqueness property, and further CUT ′ ≤ CUT but CUT ′ = CUT by its definition.
Similarly, by Lemma 12 again, the edge-disjoint paths P 1 , P 2 , · · · , P n also pass through all n different edges in CUT ′ .
In addition, due to CUT ′ = CUT, there is an edge e in CUT but not in CUT ′ . We don't loss any generality by assuming that P 1 is the path out of P 1 , P 2 , · · · , P n passing through e and denote d as the edge in CUT ′ passed through by P 1 . Consequently, one obtains d ≤ e in view of CUT ′ ≤ CUT.
Furthermore, by the Generic Augmenting Path Algorithm, the tail node of e is reachable. In other words, there must exist a f -unsaturated directed path P ′ from s to the node tail(e) by reviewing that S is the set of all nodes in V reachable from s by f -unsaturated paths. Subsequently, the path P ′ doesn't pass through any edge in CUT ′ since it is f -unsaturated. On the other hand, notice that the subpath of P 1 from head(e) to t doesn't pass through any edge in CUT ′ , either. Thus, concatenating P ′ , e, and the subpath of P 1 from head(e) to t in succession yields a directed path from s to t but not passing through the minimum cut CUT ′ , which contradicts to the hypothesis that CUT ′ is a minimum cut between s and t. Our hypothesis is not true. Therefore, the output edge-set CUT of the Generic Augmenting Path Algorithm, is the primary minimum cut between s and t, accomplishing the proof.
Next, we will analyze the complexity of the algorithm. It is easy to see that path-augmentation requires at most O(|E|) time because the search method examines any edge or any node at most once. Thus, the complexity of the Generic Augmenting Path Algorithm 4 is O(|E|) times the number of pathaugmentations, i.e., O(C t · |E|) with C t being the maximum flow value between s and t. For the worst case, since the maximum flow value is at most |V |, the complexity is upper bounded by O(|V | · |E|)
time. Therefore, it is polynomial-time algorithm for our unit-capacity case. Actually, for the general case that the edge capacity isn't unit, the Generic Augmenting Path Algorithm may runs in pseudo-polynomial time. Nevertheless, a variety of refinements of the original generic augmenting path algorithm have been proposed for polynomial-time implementations, for instances, a class of capacity scaling algorithms [33] , [34] and a class of shortest augmenting path algorithms [34] , [35] . But for our unit-capacity case, all of them require at most O(|V | · |E|) running time. Nevertheless, if we can appropriately combine features of the generic augmenting path algorithms and the shortest augmenting path algorithms, it requires only O(min{|V | 2/3 |E|, |E| 3/2 }) time for the complexity, which is consistently better than the O(|V | · |E|) bound of either algorithm by itself. Further, another type of techniques for solving the maximum flow problem has been known as preflow-push algorithms such as [36] - [39] etc., which is attractive since its better performance of the complexity for the worst case. Although all the above algorithms are polynomial-time, the algorithms based on preflow-push approach are faster than those algorithms based on augmenting path approach in their empirical behaviors.
V. CONCLUSIONS
In this paper, we study the lower bounds on the required field size for constructing SLNCs over wiretap networks. This index is very important since it largely determines the computational and space complexities of constructions, and further the efficiency of network transmission. Further, it is also very important for the process of secure network coding from theoretical research to practical applications. We proposed two new lower bounds on the field size for constructing SLNCs, which shows that the required field size can be reduced considerably without giving up any security and capacity. Actually, the second bound is better than the first one, but it is motivated by the first one. In addition, for explicit constructions of SLNCs, we study another important and interesting problem, that is how to efficiently determine these lower bounds. Motivated by a desire to develop methods with low complexity and empirical behavior to solve it, we propose efficient approaches and give a series of algorithms for implementation. Finally, we analyze the complexity of our algorithms, which shows they are polynomial-time.
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